



## Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

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### Memorandum

To: Board Members

From: Richard C. Loeb *RCZ*

Cc: Leadership Team  
Mark Kaszniak  
Christina Morgan

Subject: Board Action Report – Notation Item 2013-12

Date: February 26, 2013

On January 30, 2013, the Board approved Notation Item 2013-12, thereby designating Recommendation 2005-04-I-TX-R13, to the BP Global Executive Board of Directors (from the BP America Refinery investigation), with the status of Closed – Acceptable Action.

### Voting Summary – Notation Item 2013-12

**Disposition: APPROVED**

**Disposition date: January 30, 2013**

	Approve	Disapprove	Calendar	Not Participating	Date
R. Moure-Eraso	X				1/28/2013
M. Griffon	X				1/30/2013
B. Rosenberg	X				1/30/2013



## U. S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board RECOMMENDATIONS STATUS CHANGE SUMMARY

<b>Report:</b>	<b>BP America Refinery Explosion, Texas City</b>
<b>Recommendation Number:</b>	<b>2005-04-I-TX-R13</b>
<b>Date Issued:</b>	<b>March 23, 2007</b>
<b>Recipient:</b>	<b>BP Global Executive Board of Directors</b>
<b>New Status:</b>	<b>R13: Closed – Acceptable Action</b>
<b>Date of Status Change:</b>	<b>January 30, 2013</b>

### Recommendation Text:

*Ensure and monitor that senior executives use leading and lagging process safety indicators to measure and strengthen safety performance in your refineries.*

### Board Status Change Decision:

#### A. Rationale for Recommendation

On March 23, 2005, the BP Texas City refinery experienced severe explosions and a fire that resulted in 15 deaths, 180 injuries and significant economic losses. At the time of the incident, the CSB found that BP Group oversight and Texas City management focused primarily on personal safety with very little, if any, emphasis on process safety and the prevention of catastrophic accidents. As personal injury safety statistics improved, BP Group executives stated that they thought safety performance was headed in the right direction. At the same time, process safety continued to deteriorate at Texas City. This decline, combined with a legacy of safety and maintenance budget cuts from prior years, led to major problems with mechanical integrity, training, and safety leadership. The Board issued a recommendation to address this shortcoming.

#### B. Response to the Recommendation

BP reported that a variety of process safety and integrity management indicators are currently being tracked, including the following leading and lagging indicators: a Process Safety Incident Index; the number of fires and explosions; loss of primary containment; flammable gas releases; number and volume of oil spills; overdue plant inspections and tests; progress on implementation of BP's Operating Management System (OMS); and performance on Major Accident risk assessments. These metrics are being published in a quarterly report. BP asserted that these metrics are reviewed by BP's internal Safety, Ethics, Environment Assurance Committee (SEEAC), Group Operations Risk Committee (GORC) as well as refinery leadership.

#### C. Board Analysis and Decision

The information provided indicates that BP is effectively reporting leading and lagging process safety indicators to senior executives and that these are in turn used to monitor and improve performance in BP's refining and marketing business segment. As this activity is consistent with

the intent of CSB Recommendation No. 2005-04-I-TX-R13, the status of this recommendation was changed to **Closed – Acceptable Action**.